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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Latin America was fundamental to the creation of the Court.1  The original 
proposal of an international court came from Trinidad and Tobago, and people 
involved in Latin American struggles against dictatorship ended up being 
some of the primary actors supporting the Court in 1998.2  Almost all the 
states in Latin America are States Parties to the Court.3  Most of those states 
have incorporated the crimes under the Rome Statute into their own criminal 
statutes, and some have initiated their own national prosecutions for the 
crimes in the Rome Statute.4  Thus, Latin America is a region that has been 
both influenced by the Court and has influenced the shape and the develop-
ment of the Court. 
There are no cases from Latin America presently before the Court.  All of 
the action is in the preliminary examination stage of ICC procedure.  Accord-
ing to the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) Policy Paper on Preliminary Ex-
aminations, there are a number of issues that the Prosecutor must consider in 
deciding whether or not to open an investigation.5  Article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the 
Statute establishes the legal framework that ICC prosecutors must consider.6  
It provides that the Prosecutor shall consider: jurisdiction (temporal, material, 
and either territorial or personal jurisdiction); admissibility (complementarity 
and gravity); and the interests of justice.7  In considering material jurisdiction, 
the Prosecutor must consider whether crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court have been committed.8  The standard of proof for proceeding with an 
investigation into a situation under the Statute is a “reasonable basis.”9 
 
     1 Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Int’l Criminal Court and Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights sign Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1191&ln=en. 
     2 See Overview:  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://legal.un.org/ 
icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2019). 
 3 Jamaica, Haiti, Cuba and Nicaragua are among the few non-party states.  See The 
States Parties to the Rome Statute, Latin America and Caribbean States, INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/latin%20american%20and 
%20caribbean%20states/Pages/latin%20american%20and%20caribbean%20states.aspx 
(last visited May 28, 2019). 
     4 See Mikel Delagrange, Latin America: The Next Frontier for the ICC?, 5 FIU L. Rev. 
293 (2009). 
 5 Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT (Nov. 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-policy_paper_preliminary_ 
examinations_2013-eng.pdf. 
    6 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
      7  Id. 
    8 Id. 
    9 Id. 
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There have been four recent preliminary examinations of Latin American 
allegations: two are now closed, two are still open, and there are several re-
quests for additional preliminary examinations.  The two closed examinations 
involved Honduras and Venezuela.  The Honduran examination followed the 
2009 coup in Honduras.10  After the coup, there were a number of people 
killed in demonstrations and many arbitrary detentions.11  Civil society groups 
provided additional information to the prosecutor focused on killings of peas-
ant activists in the Bajo Aguán region.12  That case was closed in 2015 on 
grounds that the information submitted was insufficient to find a reasonable 
basis of crimes within the Court’s remit.13 
The Venezuelan preliminary examination is discussed in Section III be-
low.  However, a case regarding the attacks on government opponents after 
the 2002 attempted coup against then-President Hugo Chavez was closed in 
2006 on grounds that the statutory requirements were not satisfied.14  The al-
legations within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court15 were found not to 
constitute a “widespread or systematic attack,” as required by Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute.16  The allegations included “45 victims of murder, 39 to 44 
[cases of] imprisonment, 42 of torture and larger numbers of victims of per-
secution.”17  All allegations were against political opponents.  The OTP found 
that “[e]ven on a generous evaluation of the information provided, the availa-
ble information did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the require-
ment of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population had 
been satisfied.”18 
 
    10 Office of the Prosecutor, Preliminary Examination: Honduras, INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/honduras (last visited May 28, 2019). 
    11 See, e.g., PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41064, HONDURAN POLITICAL 
CRISIS, JUNE 2009-JANUARY 2010 (2010). 
 12 Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 10.  See also Statement, Fatou Bensouda, Prose-
cutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, On the Conclusion of the Preliminary Examination into the Situation in 
Honduras (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-28-10-
2015. 
    13 Id. 
 14 Office of the Prosecutor, Response Regarding Preliminary Examination, INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT (Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E2BC725-6A63-
40B8-8CDC-ADBA7BCAA91F/143684/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Venezuela_9_Febru 
ary_2006.pdf. 
 15 Id. Those allegations that concerned events prior to July 1, 2002 were outside the 
temporal jurisdiction of the Court. 
   16 Id. at 4. 
   17 Id. at 3. 
   18 Id. at 4. 
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II.   COLOMBIA:  CAREFUL CALIBRATION OF OTP INTERVENTION 
Colombia is the subject of one of the two pending preliminary examina-
tions before the OTP.  The Colombian preliminary examination has been a 
marathon and illustrates both the utility and the limits of this mechanism.  The 
OTP opened a preliminary examination in 2004 into the armed conflict “be-
tween and among government forces, paramilitary armed groups and rebel 
armed groups . . . .”19  In 2012, the OTP found there was a reasonable basis to 
conclude that crimes within the jurisdiction of the court, including war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, had indeed been committed.20  The OTP found 
that at the time the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and 
National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla groups and the paramilitaries (and 
perhaps their successor organizations) were responsible for crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes, and that the military––at least at the level of certain 
brigades––had developed a policy of “false positives” by which poor young 
men were killed and then made to appear as though they were dead FARC 
fighters, in order for the military to increase their bonus pay.21  The prelimi-
nary examination remains in the phase of considering whether complementa-
rity has been met.22 
The OTP has been trying to calibrate how to influence domestic processes 
in Colombia towards greater accountability without having to actually open 
an investigation.  They have worked through multiple channels to do that,  
issuing continuing reports, conducting multiple visits of OTP staff to Colom-
bia, organizing visits of Colombians to the Hague, and sending correspond-
 
 19 The preliminary examination is of war crimes committed since November 1, 2009, 
and crimes against humanity committed since November 1, 2002.  The difference in timing 
is due to a declaration filed by Colombia pursuant to Article 124 excluding war crimes 
from the jurisdiction of the ICC for a seven-year period.  See Preliminary Examination; 
Columbia, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,   https://www.icc-cpi.int/colombia (last visited June 17, 
2019). 
 20 See Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Colombia, Interim Report, INT’L CRIMINAL 
COURT (Nov. 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3D3055BD-16E2-4C83-BA8 
5-35BCFD2A7922/285102/OTPCOLOMBIAPublicInterimReportNovember2012.pdf. 
    21 Id. at ¶ 8.  See also Colombia: New Army Commanders Linked to Killings, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/27/colombia-new-
army-commanders-linked-killings. 
   22 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT 1, 44 (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-
rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf [hereinafter 2018 Report].  The 2018 Report focused on progress in 
the false positives, forced displacement, sexual violence and paramilitary cases, and on 
recent holdings by the Constitutional Court.  The preliminary investigation remains in 
Phase 3, consideration of complementarity and gravity. 
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ence (public and private) at key moments, especially as the peace process de-
veloped, first with the paramilitaries, and most recently with the FARC.23  For 
example, the Prosecutor, in two letters addressed to the country’s constitu-
tional court, argued that the Rome Statute requires actual incarceration as pun-
ishment for international crimes.24  On July 26, 2013, Prosecutor Bensouda 
wrote that “The decision to suspend a prison sentence would suggest that the 
proposed judicial process has the purpose of removing the accused from his 
criminal responsibility,” thus potentially triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction.25 
The most important influence has been, perhaps, indirect.  The peace pro-
cesses in Colombia have bargained in the shadow of the law.26  So, as noted, 
decisions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia have taken into account the 
provisions of the Rome Statute when assessing what is legal under Colombian 
law, especially with respect to the creation of the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace.27  The Rome Statute and the correspondence that has become public 
from the court has also been instrumental in the way all of the political actors 
of Colombia have used it.  There is, however, a complicating factor in trying 
to understand the influence of the OTP: Colombia is also a party to the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights, and is therefore subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights.28  In some 
ways, especially with respect to the rights of victims, the Inter-American sys-
tem is more demanding than the Rome Statute.  In others, it might provide 
more flexibility.  For example, with respect to the need for proportional pun-
ishment, the Inter-American Court may take a harder line.29 
 
   23 See Situation in Columbia, Interim Report, supra note 20; and 2018 Report, supra note 
22, for descriptions of OTP activities. 
   24 The letters were cited in a Constitutional Court case upholding the Framework for 
Peace.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Aug. 23, 2013, Sentencia C-5 
79/13 (Colom), http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2013/C-579-13.htm.  The 
OTP also sent an amicus curiae brief to the C.C. to be used in its consideration of the 
legality of the amnesty law and law implementing the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.  In 
addition to the question of incarceration, the OTP expressed concerns about the definition 
of command responsibility and restrictions on war crimes prosecutions.  2018 Report, su-
pra note 22, at 41-42. 
   25 Id. 
   26 The idea is that the parties bargain taking into account the projected legal outcomes 
should they not come to agreement and end up in trial.  See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 
(1979). 
 27 See, e.g., Brian Harper & Holly K. Sonneland, Explainer: Colombia’s Special Juris-
diction for Peace, COUNCIL AMS. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.as-coa.org/articles/ex-
plainer-colombias-special-jurisdiction-peace-jep. 
   28  Dep’t of Int’l Law, Multilateral Treaties, American Convention on Human Right 
“Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”, ORG. OF AM. STATES,https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B 
-32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2019). 
 29 For an example of Inter-American Court jurisprudence on proportionality of punish-
ment, see La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
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The way different Colombian actors have used the Rome Statute has varied 
over time.  At the beginning of the peace process, it was mostly victims’ 
groups that raised the idea that if there is not adequate attention paid to justice 
for the victims, the Rome Statute will apply and the ICC will step in.30  There 
was a widely shared understanding that ICC involvement was something to 
be avoided, especially since Colombia’s legal system is quite complex and 
well-respected.31  That meant that a blanket amnesty was off the table.  Now 
however, after the parties reached a peace accord in 2016, the local actors 
have flipped positions.  The victims’ groups and their allies are now on the 
side arguing to give this flexible agreement a chance, while the right-wing 
government of Iván Duque has argued that no amnesty should apply.32  Duque 
(and his main backer, former president Alvaro Uribe), the former Inspector 
General Alejandro Ordoñez, along with the current Prosecutor, have led the 
opposition to the agreement, especially the provisions involving the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace.33  They argue the peace agreement’s provisions on pun-
ishment of the FARC leadership are too lenient and that the Rome Statute 
requires prison time. 
In fact, the discussion between Colombia and the ICC on the question of 
punishment has been key.  One of the interesting aspects of the Colombian 
peace agreement is that it separates investigation and trial from punishment.34  
 
163 (May 11, 2007).  For a discussion in the Inter-American Court on post-conflict pun-
ishment in the context of peace processes that suggests greater flexibility, see Judge García-
Sayan’s separate opinion in Massacres of El Mozote and Neighboring Locations v. El Sal-
vador, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶¶ 30-31 (Oct. 25, 2012). 
   30 See, e.g., the interventions of the Colombian Commission of Jurists before the Consti-
tutional Court and elsewhere.  Letter from Colombian Commission of Jurists to Constitu-
tional Court (July 25, 2013) (available at http://iccnow.org/documents/ColJuristasinterven-
cion.pdf). 
   31 See, e.g., Santiago Vargas Niño, La JEP: ¿cómo evitar que la Corte Penal Internacio-
nal intervenga en Colombia?, RAZÓN PÚBLICA (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.razonpu-
blica.com/index.php/conflicto-drogas-y-paz-temas-30/10724-la-jep-c%C3%B3mo-evitar-
que-la-corte-penal-internacional-intervenga-en-colombia.html. 
   32 Daniela Blandón Ramírez, Colombia: a pesar de sus objeciones, presidente Duque 
firmó la ley Estatutaria de la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, FRANCE 24 (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.france24.com/es/20190607-colombia-duque-ley-acuerdo-paz-jep. 
   33 Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace in Colombia, INT’L 
CRISIS GROUP (June 21, 2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/an-
des/colombia/67-risky-business-duque-governments-approach-peace-colombia; Debut de 
Alejandro Ordóñez y Álvaro Uribe contra el acuerdo de paz, EL TIEMPO (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/oposicion-de-alejandro-ordonez-y-al-
varo-uribe-a-firma-del-acuerdo-final-35307. 
 34 As summarized by Harper & Sonneland, supra note 27. 
If the accused admits to his or her crimes up front, he or she will serve 
between five to eight years of an alternative sentence that deprives them 
of various personal liberties if the crime is serious, and between two to 
five years if the crime is not.  Alternative sentences can include house 
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At first, the OTP was firmly opposed to the lack of prison sentences for those 
who cooperate, give information and provide reparation to victims, in the 
name of proportional punishment.35  As was pointed out by supporters of the 
Special Jurisdiction, the Rome Statute does not say anything about punish-
ment, which is generally left to national law under international treaties.36  The 
Rome Statute instead prescribes what kinds of punishments the court itself 
should impose but does not say anything about what national courts are re-
quired to do.37  And, through a process of dialogue and several rounds of cor-
respondence, the ICC’s position became less rigid, and it had, until recently, 
taken a wait-and-see attitude on the issue.38 
 
arrest and/or community service, to be meted out in agreement with the 
victim(s), to whom they might also owe reparations.  Reparations in-
cluded the removal of mines and explosives from territories in which 
FARC had operated, finding, identifying, and returning the remains of 
people who went missing during the conflict, new judicial mechanisms 
to break apart criminal organizations, and the restitution of land titles. 
That said, the defendant could spend their sentence in a regular prison if 
he or she doesn’t fess up to crimes initially but only does so after a crim-
inal investigation.  Finally, if the accused refuses to take responsibility 
for any crime and is later found guilty by the court, he or she faces a 
sentence of 15 to 20 years in a regular prison. 
   Id. 
    35 Una ‘carta bomba’, SEMANA (Aug. 17, 2013), https://www.semana.com/nacion/ar-
ticulo/una-carta-bomba/354430-3.   
    36 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 77-80, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. Articles 77-80 of the Rome Statute deal with penalties. 
    37  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 80, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (specifically stating that “Nothing in this Part affects the application by States of penal-
ties prescribed by their national law, nor the law of States which do not provide for penal-
ties prescribed in this Part.”). 
 38 In a speech in May 2018, the Deputy Prosecutor declared: 
The OTP has already expressed its position that the suspension of sen-
tences would be manifestly inadequate, as this would, in effect, allow 
individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of 
the most serious crimes to avoid any real punishment.  Reduced sen-
tences are conceivable, however, as long as the convicted person must 
fulfil certain conditions that would justify an attenuated sentence.  The 
OTP has noted that such conditions could include acknowledgement of 
criminal responsibility, demobilization and disarmament, guarantees of 
non-repetition, full participation in the process of establishing the truth 
about serious crimes, a possible temporary ban from taking part in public 
affairs, among other measures.  Such conditions might justify reducing a 
sentence that would otherwise be proportionate to the gravity of the crime 
and the degree of responsibility of the perpetrator.  Alternative or non-
custodial sentences, involving restrictions upon liberty, supervision and 
obligations, must also be consistent with a genuine intent to bring the 
convicted persons to justice.  In assessing such sentences, the OTP will 
consider a range of factors that would include the usual national practice 
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However, the ICC’s deferential approach may change in light of President 
Duque’s blatant hostility towards the whole peace process, and especially the 
Special Jurisdiction.  As Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart said in 2018: the 
OTP  must “satisfy[] [it]self that the array of transitional justice measures ap-
plied in the situation in Colombia meet, in a genuine way, the Rome Statute 
goals.”39  The Colombian government’s insistence on changes to the Special 
Jurisdiction’s procedural law, and the delays in implementation, has raised 
alarms and voices calling for ICC intervention.40  While the Special Jurisdic-
tion statute has now become law,41 a rocky road no doubt lies ahead. 
III.   VENEZUELA:  NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH 
Venezuela is back on the OTP’s radar, as a new preliminary examination 
commenced in 2018.42  There are two factors present in the Venezuelan pre-
liminary examination that are missing from the Colombian examination.  One 
is that Venezuela has withdrawn from the American Convention on Human 
Rights and from the Organization of American States (OAS), which means 
the regional human rights system has little purchase.43  Second, unlike Co-
lombia, there is a state referral in Venezuela.44  The prosecutor began consid-
ering Venezuela in February 2018.45  Later that year, five Latin American 
countries and Canada filed a joint referral to the ICC about the situation in 
Venezuela.46  A state referral allows a case to be submitted directly to a pre-
trial chamber, which was done here on September 28, 2018.47 
 
in sentencing for Rome Statute crimes, the proportionality of the sen-
tence in relation to the gravity of the crime and the degree of responsibil-
ity of the offender, the type and degree of restrictions on liberty, any mit-
igating circumstances, the reasons the sentencing judge gave for passing 
the particular sentence, and so on. 
James Stewart, The Role of the ICC in the Transitional Justice Process in Colombia, INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT (May 30, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/201805SpeechDP 
.pdf. 
    39 Id. 
 40 Kai Ambos & Susann Aboueldahab, Colombia:  Time for the ICC Prosecutor to Act?, 
EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/colombia-time-for-the-icc-prosecutor 
-to-act/. 
   41 Ramírez, supra note 32. 
   42 2018 Report, supra note 22, at 29-33. 
   43 Venezuela to Withdraw from OAS, Denounces Campaign by Washington, REUTERS 
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oas/venezuela-to-with-
draw-from-oas-denounces-campaign-by-washington-idUSKBN17S330. 
   44 2018 Report, supra note 22, at 29. 
   45 Id. 
   46 Id. 
   47 Id. 
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Most of the information the Court is working with is based on prior inves-
tigations, including those of the Inter-American Commission,48 the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights,49 and an OAS expert panel.  In 2018, the 
OAS Secretary General appointed a panel of independent international experts 
to investigate whether international crimes had been committed in Venezuela.  
In May 2018, the panel found that reasonable grounds existed to believe that 
crimes against humanity have been committed in Venezuela dating back to at 
least February 12, 2014.50 
Submissions to the Court have focused on crimes against humanity com-
mitted by police, military and paramilitary forces in the service of the re-
gime.51  These crimes have occurred largely in the context of demonstrations 
and political activities, especially since 2017.  The operating assumption has 
been that these are attacks on a civilian population, carried out against oppo-
nents of the regime.  While numbers are hard to come by, the OAS Expert 
Group estimated that 131 people had been killed in the context of several years 
of anti-regime demonstrations, and another 8,292 had been executed in a 
broader context of government repression and political persecution.52  The 
widespread or systematic nature of the alleged crimes has derived from the 
fact that attacks have occurred in multiple cities and on numerous occasions.  
Under the Rome Statute, prosecutorial action requires a state or organizational 
 
 48 Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela, INTER-AM. 
COMM’N HUMAN RIGHTS (2017), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Venezuela2018 
-en.pdf. 
 49 Office High Comm’r Human Rights, Human Rights Violations in the Bolivarian Re-
public of Venezuela: A Downward Spiral with No End in Sight, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS (June 
2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/VenezuelaReport2018_EN.pdf. 
 50 The panel of experts—Santiago Cantón (Argentina), Irwin Cotler (Canada), and Ma-
nuel Ventura Robles (Costa Rica)—did not investigate on their own, but rather used the 
evidence collected in five public OAS hearings.  The panel found that reasonable grounds 
exist to find that, “[t]he opposition, or those identified as such, were branded as the ‘internal 
enemy’ of the State, turning large segments of the civilian population into targets for the 
military, paramilitary and regular security forces who operate in a coordinated manner to 
‘defend the Bolivarian Revolution.’”   The panel recommended that the Secretary General 
of the OAS should submit the report and the evidence to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  The Secretary General did so, and also invited States Parties to the Rome Statute 
to refer the situation of Venezuela to the OTP.  Executive Summary, ORG. AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Venezuela-Executive-Summary.pdf (last visited 
June 17, 2019) (hereinafter OAS Report). 
   51 2018 Report, supra note 22, at 31. 
 52 OAS Report, supra note 50, at 389.  In addition, submissions to the Office of the Pros-
ecutor recount arbitrary detentions, torture, forced disappearances and persecution.  These 
include detention of political opponents, attacks on demonstrators, torture in detention, and 
the like. 
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policy.53  Here, the policy is deemed to be the illegal means or excessive force 
aimed at countering political opposition. 
However, there is a complementary narrative that has received far less at-
tention from those seeking to hold the Venezuelan leadership accountable.  
Venezuela is an opportunity for the Court to consider the underlying condi-
tions of state capture and grand corruption that drive the need of that govern-
ment to stay in power.  Extensive, systemic, and controlling corruption today 
provides much of the real raison d’etre of the Maduro government and its 
military allies.  Over the last years, a shadowy alliance of ruling party politi-
cians, high-ranking military officers, organized crime (including but not lim-
ited to drug traffickers) and some members of the private sector have looted 
the Venezuelan economy for their own benefit, all made possible by corrupt 
use of the levers of state power.54  This alliance has erased the independence 
of the judiciary and of prosecutors; commandeered the oil industry, gold min-
ing, food distribution networks, and even foreign exchange markets; ensured 
complete impunity for their actions; and used the natural resources and fi-
nances of the state to enrich themselves and their cronies.  Moreover, targets 
have included not only demonstrators but indigenous people, artisanal miners, 
soldiers and military officers, and others who might create obstacles to the 
looting of the state with impunity.55 
In other words, the government is not staying in power because they want 
the socialist revolution to survive.  Not at this point.  The reason why the 
regime and its supporters absolutely need control of the justice system, why 
they have weakened the country’s institutions, why they have gone after not 
just civilians, but people within the government itself and the military, is be-
cause kleptocracy, or grand corruption, is driving the need to stay in power. 
A corruption lens, as has been applied here, will help strengthen and focus 
the Court’s work in cases like Venezuela, where systemic corruption plays a 
key explanatory role.  Viewing similar cases through such a lens allows for a 
broader scope when denouncing and judging human rights violations and 
atrocities, pulling the evidentiary string to the point of fully understanding the 
causes and rethinking ways to address them.  Such a lens has narrative power 
and exposes ideological discourses of both the left and right as simple rhetoric, 
thus changing the national and international context in which the Court will 
have to seek support and potentially creating new alliances.  Additionally, a 
corruption-based view connects the Court’s work to the issues of corruption 
 
   53 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art, 7(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
   54 See, e.g., Venezuela:  A Mafia State?, INSIGHT CRIME (May 2018), https://www.in-
sightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Venezuela-a-Mafia-State-InSight-Crime-
2018.pdf. 
   55 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Santiago Martinez, Venezuela, Grand Corruption, and the 
International Criminal Court (May 2, 2019), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3381986. 
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and natural resource extraction that are at the heart of popular protests and 
reform movements in the region.56 
Finally, using this lens in Venezuela might make it easier for the Court to 
consider the situation of Mexico, where over 200,000 people have died and 
32,000 have disappeared since 2006, killed by both state and non-state actors 
in the context of the “war on drugs.”57  There have now been at least three 
major submissions to the OTP to open a preliminary examination, but to date, 
none have been accepted.58  Part of the problem has been developing a coher-
ent theory on what, in this context, is a “state or organizational policy,” as 
required by the Rome Statute for crimes against humanity.  A corruption-fo-
cused lens may help supply answers to that question.59 
 
    56 Id. 
    57 Gerardo Lissardy, México: ¿por qué no hay más indignación internacional ante los 
miles de muertos y desaparecidos?, BBC (June 22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ 
noticias-america-latina-44434406. 
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